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ABSTRACT 
 
In this perspective article, Derek Abell, former Professor of Harvard, founder of IMD (Swiss) and ESMT (Germany), 
presents the perspective of strategy management and strategy management evolution in an executive view. The 
objective is to provide mainly the students and practitioners a broad view of strategy evolution and its’ future 
challenges. 
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O PASSADO, PRESENTE E FUTURO DA ESTRATÉGIA: AMPLIANDO OS DESAFIOS; 
COMPREENDENDO OS AVANÇOS 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Neste artigo perspectiva, Derek Abell, ex-professor de Harvard, fundador do IMD (Suíça) e ESMT (Alemanha), 
apresenta o ponto de vista da gestão da estratégia e evolução da gestão da estratégia em uma visão executiva. O objetivo 
é fornecer, principalmente, aos estudantes e profissionais uma visão ampla da evolução da estratégia e seus desafios 
futuros. 
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PASADO, PRESENTE Y FUTURO DE LA ESTRATEGIA: AMPLIACIÓN DE LOS RETOS; 
COMPRENSIÓN DE LOS AVANCES 
 
 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
En este artículo de perspectiva, Derek Abell, ex profesor de Harvard, fundador del IMD (Suiza) y ESMT (Alemania), 
presenta la perspectiva de la gestión de la estrategia y la evolución gestión de la estrategia en una vista ejecutiva. El 
objetivo es proporcionar principalmente a los estudiantes y profesionales de una amplia visión de la evolución y 
estrategia de sus "retos del futuro. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The answer to the question “what is strategy?” 
depends on when the question is asked. And the 
famous quote by ex-Yankee baseball star Yogi Berra 
“The future ain’t what it used to be” applies as aptly to 
strategy as it does to life in general. Both the meaning 
of strategy and its practice have changed considerably 
over the years, and more changes are already on the 
horizon.  
There are two reasons why such an 
evolutionary perspective is important for practicing 
executives: The first has to do with differing 
impressions of the scope of strategy. Oftentimes, 
lacking a broader evolutionary perspective, different 
members of the same company management team, 
describe their business strategy differently! They 
simply focus on that part of strategy that they are most 
familiar with personally, and fail to recognize and 
communicate other dimensions that, for one reason or 
another, were important to other organizations at other 
times. The second reason for understanding the origins 
and future strategy has to do with focus. New strategic 
insights have invariably resulted as a response to new 
strategic challenges. Those executives who understand 
the relationships between challenges confronted and 
approaches that may be used to resolve these 
challenges are better placed to resolve their own 
specific challenges. 
The scope and precise definition of strategy 
has changed and continues to change for three main 
reasons: First and foremost, strategic ‘thinking’ evolves 
to meet the new business challenges of the times, and 
the challenges that executives confront today are a far 
cry from what they confronted even a few decades ago. 
If we are to believe Yogi Berra, future challenges will 
result in changing our strategic thinking further. 
Second, the scope and definition of strategy has 
evolved as academics, consultants and practitioners 
themselves have developed new ‘research’ insights into 
what elements of strategy need to be considered in 
different situations and why. Third, our understanding 
of business strategy is inspired by thinking in other 
fields—within and beyond business. Within business, 
developments in areas such as innovation, change 
management, and leadership, which overlap with 
strategy, have stimulated new strategic thinking. 
Beyond business, military and political strategy, the 
biological sciences, and most recently the arts in 
general, have contributed to and inspired our business 
thinking. Commenting on the second of these, Bruce 
Henderson, founder of the Boston Consulting Group 
(BCG), once remarked “Biologists may be better 
guides to business than economists”!  
 
 
 
 
 
2 STRATEGY’S CONSTANT COMMON CORE 
 
‘Plus ça change, plus ça reste le même’. Yes, 
that is also true of the essence of strategy. After many 
meanders and attempts to track the evolution of 
strategy at each twist and turn along the way, this 
author at least has concluded that business strategy 
does consist, and has always consisted, of five 
primordial decisions. The scope and definition of each 
may well evolve for any of the reasons above, but the 
skeletal form remains the same. These five primordial 
strategic elements (and functional strategies including 
marketing strategy, operations strategy, financial 
strategy, HR strategy etc. have to be aligned with these 
five) are decisions with respect to: 
 
1) Strategic purpose and objectives 
2) The definition of the business in both 
horizontal and vertical terms 
3) The positioning of the business in terms of 
choices between perceived value and 
delivered cost/price  
4) The segmentation scheme used (if at all) to 
divide the market, and the specific segments 
targeted 
5) The basis for differentiation from competitors, 
and the specific Unique Selling Proposition 
(USP) claimed 
 
There is less agreement in the literature of 
strategy about these primordial dimensions than might 
be imagined. Any scan of the literally thousands of 
books and articles dealing with this subject will reveal, 
perhaps surprisingly, quite wide variation in what 
strategy consists of, even at a single point in time. 
From this author’s perspective, the understanding of 
strategy which is needed, and which is the subject of 
this article, is not to home in on any one or other set of 
dimensions; it is rather to understand how the scope 
and definition of each of these dimensions has 
developed and is likely to develop, with time. As we 
look back over the last 100 or so years of business 
history, and try to glimpse the future, the five elements 
referred to above will always be found to be present in 
some form or other. What changes is their relative 
priority and a deeper understanding of what is meant 
by each. 
As we look back to the past and ahead to the 
future, it will be necessary also to separate what we 
mean by the content of strategy, and what might also 
be said about the organizational structures and 
processes within which strategy is made. Changing 
business challenges, new research insight and 
inspiration from other fields have impacted all three of 
these, not just strategy itself. 
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3 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGY 
 
Strategy as a military concept predates its use 
in business. We only have to read ‘The Art of War’, a 
military treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, a high-ranking 
Chinese military general, strategist and tactician, to 
realize that the origins of strategy go back at least 2500 
years. All that we know of Egyptian and Greek 
civilization (Homer’s ‘Iliad’ for example) tells us that 
it goes back even further than that. One of Sun Tzu’s 
most quoted pieces of strategic wisdom is ‘those who 
excel in defeating their enemies triumph before the 
enemy’s threat becomes real’—wise words for 
business strategists for sure! Not so clearly recognized 
until more recently was that military strategists need 
strategies to win current battles, but also enjoy 
‘downtime’ to strategically reconfigure their fighting 
forces for battles in the future. And it only became 
clear in the 1960s and 70s, as the speed of change 
picked up after steady post-war recovery and growth, 
that business also needed a ‘dual strategy’ agenda 
(Abell, 1993).  The difference is that business does not 
enjoy the same luxury of downtime; strategies for 
winning current competitive encounters have to go on 
in parallel with strategic preparations for the future.  
Military strategy from periods all the way 
from Sun Tzu’s time to the present continues to inform 
business strategy. Perhaps one of the most widely read 
books on this subject is de Caulincourt’s ‘With 
Napeoleon in Russia’, but for those who are interested 
in the military’s contributions to strategic thinking, this 
is only one of very many sources.  ‘Must’ references 
are Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’ and ‘The Art of War’.  
The following quotations surely demonstrate 
Machiavelli’s relevance to business strategy:  
“Entrepreneurs are simply those who 
understand that there is little difference between 
obstacle and opportunity and are able to turn both to 
their advantage.” 
“Never was anything great achieved without 
danger.” 
“I am not interested in preserving the status 
quo; I want to overthrow it.” 
Other roots of strategic thinking can be traced 
to developments in the biological sciences. Bruce 
Henderson, founder of BCG, and referred to earlier, 
published a seminal short paper in the 1960s entitled 
‘The Origins of Strategy’. In this paper he likened the 
search by business for competitive advantage and 
differentiation to the struggle for survival which 
Charles Darwin so brilliantly exposed in ‘The Origin of 
Species’. It is also only more recently that the two 
forms of evolution that Darwin identified, namely the 
slow incremental improvements that mark ‘the survival 
of the fittest’, and the periodic mutations which change 
the direction of evolution more abruptly  have, as we 
shall see later, their exact counterparts in business 
innovation and business strategy.  
The arts have provided another important 
source of inspiration to business thinking—particularly 
more recently. Creativity is of course an underlying 
theme, but the literary and performing arts provide 
many references to leadership and strategy, while the 
visual arts teach us to distinguish between the real and 
the apparent, and to look at the world from multiple 
perspectives. Painters particularly have had an almost 
uncanny ability to portray emerging trends—an ability 
much in demand by those who make strategy. Both 
painting and music also provide us with deep insight 
into the nature of patterns—another growing 
requirement for those trying to decipher the future. 
 
 
4 THE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS STRATEGY 
AND THINKING  
 
As far as developments in business itself are 
concerned, we can reasonably begin our story with the 
Industrial Revolution, although early traders were 
certainly concerned with business concepts from times 
immemorial.  The Industrial Revolution was the 
transition to new machine-driven manufacturing 
processes in the period from about 1760 to some time 
between 1820 and 1840. This transition included not 
only going from hand-production methods to machines, 
but also new chemical manufacturing, and some non-
production process improvements. It coincided with the 
increasing use of steam power and with the 
development of machine tools. The Industrial 
Revolution was above all a shift in production 
technologies and processes. Prices fell dramatically as 
manual work was displaced by machines, but it is 
questionable whether many of the new capitalists were 
yet thinking strategically about the many new business 
options which were to appear. Marketing in the sense 
that we understand today was unheard of, and sales of 
goods produced was the main pre-occupation on the 
market side. As the Industrial Revolution gathered 
momentum, producers were looking at vast new 
markets resulting from price levels heretofore unknown 
and these ‘sellers markets’ meant that strategy was still 
largely unnecessary to succeed. Far more important 
was to adopt the new mechanized production processes 
(often with great worker upheavals and resistance), to 
lower costs and prices, and to provide the new 
industrialized goods to a hungry market.  
A century later, Henry Ford applied many of 
the concepts of the Industrial Revolution to the nascent 
automobile industry. His brilliance was not so much to 
conceive and develop the methods of mass production, 
but to recognize that if a car could be produced for a 
few hundred rather than a few thousand dollars, the 
market for such a vehicle would be huge. The result 
was 14 million Model-T Fords, all virtually identical!  
The (in)famous quote ‘you can have any color you like 
as long as it’s black’ defined this production-centered 
approach. Was this strategy? Certainly yes, but it was 
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only when General Motors under Sloan’s leadership, 
responded in the late 1920s with its five car lines 
(Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, Buick, Pontiac, Cadillac) to 
meet the needs of different value segments that the 
strategic option of value vs price positioning was seen 
for the first time. And actually it was really only 
identified as a strategic alternative to Ford’s low-cost 
approach in the 1970s, when Professor William (‘Bill’) 
thy at the Harvard Business School published his 
article “Limits to the Learning Curve” in the Harvard 
Business Review (Abernathy & Wayne, 1974). 
We can see this phenomenon repeatedly as we 
trace the evolution of strategic thinking. A ‘strategy’ is 
used in practice, but not initially recognized as such, 
even by its protagonists. It is only later—sometimes 
decades later—that it is expressed in conceptual terms 
by a ‘student’ of practice, for a broader set of 
practitioners and academics to understand. This 
development of concepts which have their roots in 
practice itself is quite different, as we shall see as we 
go along, from the more deliberate empirical research 
whose very aim is to develop new theory.  
The conceptualization of business strategy 
took a leap forward in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. The sea change was the arrival of 
‘marketing’—the notion that a firm had to produce (in 
the larger sense of the word) what it could sell, not sell 
what it could produce. Marketing was broadly defined 
not only by getting the product itself right, but also its 
price, promotion, and distribution—the famous 4 Ps of 
the marketing mix. It is not going too far to say that 
marketing strategy was then strategy in many people’s 
minds. With advances in marketing thinking came 
advances in other intrinsic concepts such as 
segmentation, positioning, and differentiation. 
Strategies of ‘push’ (communication via the channels) 
and ‘pull’ (communication directly to the customer) 
were frequently used to distinguish one company 
strategy from another. 
The unprecedented growth, which resulted 
from pent-up demand after the World War in virtually 
all parts of the previously developed world, put a 
strong emphasis on choosing the right business 
approach and simply multiplying it geographically. 
Strategic change was less important in this time than 
well-oiled execution. With some ups and downs this 
strong growth continued into the late 1950s and early 
1960s. In this period of relatively stable growth the 
‘content’ of strategy changed less than organization 
and the processes for making strategy. To take 
advantage of new business opportunities and to better 
exploit existing ones, firms were diversifying and 
decentralizing. The highly centralized, top-down 
managed, functional structures which had characterized 
large enterprise up to then were giving way to new 
divisional forms of organization where divisions were 
organized around ‘lines of business’. Strategic practice 
and thinking thus took a second major leap forward, 
comparable in importance to that which occurred with 
the rise of marketing and the key strategic concepts that 
went along with it. Three major advances in the way 
we think about strategy today were all driven by this 
underlying trend to decentralized organization. This 
trend was driven in turn by both diversification and the 
increasing need to segment markets to retain 
competitive advantage.  
The first resulting advance in strategic 
thinking was to recognize more clearly the differences 
between ‘corporate’, ‘business’, and ‘functional’ 
strategies. Business-level strategies were increasingly 
needed not just at divisional levels, but for strategic 
business units (SBUs) within larger divisions. The 
second, and related advance came in new thinking 
about how to define these divisions and subdivisions in 
a way that best separated activities in separate 
competitive strategic arenas. As surprising as it seems 
today some companies up to that time were 
subdividing divisions based on simple size criteria, 
arguing, for example, that once a division exceeded 
100 million dollars in sales volume, the division should 
be split into two! New thinking about business 
definition resulted sensibly in some business units 
being split out from others with only 20 million dollars 
of sales, while others, based on arguments of strategic 
integrity, had sales of over a billion dollars. The 
underlying logic was not size per se, but whether the 
unit competed in a strategically well-defined market 
place.  
The third advance was to think of products 
within a business unit, and at a higher level, business 
units within a divisional or corporate structure, as parts 
of a financial portfolio. This occurred for two distinct 
reasons: The first was that many diversified companies 
were nudging up against debt ceilings which were 
viewed by lenders as overly risky. When debt to equity 
ratios were still below 30%, most companies could go 
down to their bank 24/7/365 to get loans to fund any 
projects which were predicted to exceed their cut-off 
hurdle rates of return. Each business in a division, and 
each division in a company could be regarded as a ‘tub 
on its own bottom’. Whatever it earned could be used 
to finance its own growth, and if funds were in short 
supply, the bank was a ready lender. But as debt to 
equity levels started to hit higher levels, and banks 
were shy of more lending, the only way to fund growth 
was with internal funds. Cash rich businesses and 
divisions had to be turned to fund the investments 
needed to grow the cash-poor ones. The idea of the 
‘product portfolio’ was born. Developed particularly by 
the consulting firm Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 
the language of ‘cash cows’, ‘stars’, ‘question marks’, 
and ‘dogs’ became common strategic parlance. BCG 
had been working in parallel on empirical research to 
understand the phenomena of experience curves, and 
these concepts were used to construct matrices which 
portrayed the cash flow consequences of various 
combinations of industry growth rates and relative 
market shares. For once, theory overtook practice as 
empirical findings demonstrated that high growth—
high share businesses typically could turn into cash 
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cows as industry growth slowed, and these funds could 
be used to drive up share in growth businesses for the 
future. Failure to invest in growth at the right time 
could result in the reverse: Instead of question marks 
becoming stars, they could slide down to unprofitable 
dog status when growth slowed. 
In the late 1960s, another important piece of 
original theoretical/empirical research (as opposed to 
the continuing efforts to conceptualize practice) 
revealed yet new strategic insight. Dubbed the ‘PIMS’ 
project (Profit Impact of Market Strategy) by its 
originators at the General Electric Company, PIMS set 
out to understand some of the most elusive strategic 
questions of this time. Why, asked then GE CEO Fred 
Borch, did some GE businesses (like steam turbine 
generators) yield very modest returns of around only 3-
4%, while others (like engineered plastics) regularly 
turned in results of more than 20%. Borch had several 
hypotheses, of which one was that market share was a 
key driver of profitability and cash flow. He turned to a 
professor from the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, Dr. Sidney Schoeffler, to search for answers. 
Data was collected on a wide array of GE businesses 
over several years and fed into a large regression 
equation with 35 independent variables and one 
dependent variable—cash flow. Lo and behold, 
Borch’s intuitive hypothesis about market share was 
borne out, along with a much deeper understanding of 
the underlying business and competitive factors 
affecting cash flow. From this, the strategic concept of 
a ‘PAR’ (as in golf) cash flow for various types of 
business and competitive situation, was born. For the 
first time, GE was able to set quite different financial 
objectives for each business based on the PAR, and 
incentive schemes followed. In fact, the PIMS project 
grew and multiplied to eventually include not just GE, 
but some 200 of the Fortune 500 firms, with data 
spanning 10 years of company history. This was 
perhaps the first time that ‘science’ was applied to 
business strategy with clear indications coming out of 
the empirically established relationships between 
different strategic variables and cash flow performance. 
Predictably, risk was one of these factors, and 
risk/return issues, which had been well documented at 
the overall corporate level in financial markets, started 
to appear on the strategic radar screens of individual 
business units. As we shall see later in this article, that 
is very much a subject for strategic thinking today, and 
most likely will continue to be in the future.  
From the author’s memory, it was Sid 
Schoeffler who coined the term ‘market strategy’, 
making a clear distinction between this and marketing 
strategy, which was concerned principally with the 4 
Ps. Market strategy in Schoeffler’s view was a 
complete business strategy for a particular market or 
market segment—a much broader concept. This paved 
the way for a better understanding of the relationship 
between corporate strategy, business unit ‘market’ 
strategy, and functional strategies. In any case, 
personal contact with Sid Schoeffler and his PIMS 
thinking deeply influenced this author’s thinking on the 
subject of strategy. One result was second-year course 
at the Harvard Business School and later a book, with 
the title ‘Strategic Market Planning’ (Abell, 1976). 
We must deviate here for a moment to turn to 
the evolution of strategic planning processes—which 
was proceeding in parallel with what we have 
described about strategy itself and the changing 
organizational structures in which strategy was 
formulated and implemented. Decentralization had 
sparked the need for improved processes to join top-
down objective setting with bottom-up detailed 
planning, and various processes were in use and being 
conceptualized to link the bottom-up and top-down in 
complementary and constructive ways. Most large 
companies had settled for a process that resulted in a 
complete and detailed strategic plan and budget for 
each separate business. The problem was to overlay 
this detail business-by-business approach with the 
growing perceived need to define some businesses as 
cash producers and others as cash users. Many times 
plans that ran into a hundred pages or more with 
detailed budgets, had to be completely reworked as 
other plans were submitted and surpluses and deficits 
became evident. Strategic planning needed to be 
streamlined and less bureaucratic. 
This time, practice led theory. Some 
companies, and Nestlé under the leadership of Helmut 
Maucher was one, drastically simplified their planning 
processes in the early 1970s, to focus on key strategic 
issues—ahead of making detailed plans. Usually this 
involved face-to-face discussions between business 
heads and corporate leadership, so that the broad 
strategic issues confronting each business could be 
identified and objectives set, ahead of detailed plans 
and budgets being worked out. This attempt to get to 
the heart of the strategic issues facing each particular 
business in the corporate portfolio triggered further 
process changes. Strategic planning moved 
increasingly from staff to line, becoming a principal 
preoccupation of business level general management—
albeit backed up by staff support. In many 
corporations, large strategic planning staffs were 
drastically reduced in scale as a result. It is worth 
noting here that other corporate staff activities 
including HR, and now CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) are headed the same way. They are 
becoming a key responsibility of line general 
management, and staff activities are being redefined to 
support this. Further streamlining of strategic processes 
has taken place in many companies, and continues right 
up to the present. One is the ‘collapsing’ of what were 
separate processes for marketing planning, strategic 
planning, financial planning and budgeting, into a 
single integrated strategic process. And there is 
increasing recognition that in such an integrated 
process, ‘vision’ must come ahead of strategy, strategy 
ahead of plans, and plans ahead of budgets. The days 
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when the annual budget had a life of its own, apart 
from these other planning elements, are either over or 
numbered.  
Our understanding of strategy took further 
jumps forward in the 1970s and 1980s in two main 
directions: First, it was increasingly recognized, thanks 
to the research efforts of Michael Porter at the Harvard 
Business School, that value could be created for 
customers not only within the firm’s own ‘value chain’ 
(which he elaborated in new terms), but also in 
‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ stages of the overall 
‘business system’. Competition was not only between 
firms at various business system stages, but from the 
end customer’s perspective, between complete business 
systems in terms of the total ‘perceived value’ and the 
total ‘delivered costs’ (which translated to price) of 
each. This represented a sharp departure from previous 
concepts of vertical integration which had dealt 
primarily with upstream and downstream ownership 
issues. Business system analysis emphasized, by 
contrast, that a firm could orchestrate its business 
system for high performance without necessarily 
incurring the fixed costs of outright ownership. Porter’s 
work on ‘Industry and Competitive Analysis’ (Porter, 
1980) led on quite naturally to concepts such as his 
‘five forces’ model, and to the benefits of predicting 
not only the likely scale of profitability, but where in 
the business system profits could best be made.  
Second, new thinking about vertical business 
systems was parallel by new advances in thinking 
about ‘horizontal’ business definition. Previously firms 
had thought about definition mainly in terms of 
products offered and markets served. This author’s 
broader perspective at the time (Abell, 1981) was to 
insist that product and market choices were simply 
manifestations of more fundamental decisions in three 
dimensions: customer groups served (‘who’); customer 
functions covered (‘what’); and ‘technologies’ or 
means used to meet these needs (‘how’). Business 
definition in both vertical and horizontal dimensions 
thus became firmly established as one of the five main 
elements of strategic decision-making. Porter went on 
to use these and other ideas to describe ‘generic’ 
strategies found in most industry sectors, namely 
‘focused’, ‘differentiated’ and ‘undifferentiated’ 
approaches to various types of market.  
A further second major development in the 
1970s and 1980s was the realization that dealing with 
change was at least as important as setting a strategy 
for the present in place, and honing it further. Spurred 
by the near failure of corporate giants like IBM to 
recognize and act on fundamental changes on their 
industry (in IBM’s case, the shift to distributed PC-
driven computing), change management took center-
stage in strategic thinking and practice. This resulted in 
developments in many further directions: in new 
thinking about ‘external’ political, social, demographic, 
technological, and environmental analysis; putting 
vision and mission ahead of strategy; and of the central 
roles of innovation, of investment, and of 
transformation to become and stay competitive and 
profitable. It became clear to many at this time that 
change was in fact a constant, driven fundamentally by 
the two forces of technology and globalization. 
Jack Welch at GE was busy at this time 
insisting in his own company that unless a business 
unit could be among the top three competitors in its 
industry, it should be sold off or closed down. A 
development which integrated change management 
with earlier concepts of current strategy was the idea, 
mentioned earlier, that companies needed ‘dual 
strategies’ (Abell, 1993)—namely one strategy to 
succeed today, and a second strategy for the future. 
And as we had noted earlier, unlike the military, which 
mostly has the luxury of finishing one war and having 
a break to prepare for the next, business has to manage 
‘today-for-today’ and ‘today-for-tomorrow’ in parallel. 
One observer2 likened this to ‘changing the wheels on 
the train while it is running down the track’. 
By the turn of the century, Darwin’s theories 
of evolution were increasingly recognized as being 
applicable to business. Making a difference between 
incremental change and innovation (which Darwin had 
identified as the slow process of evolution in which the 
fittest survive) and strategic ‘game-changing’ 
innovation (which Darwin had identified as mutations) 
was not only becoming clearer but more of an 
imperative. The vocabulary of strategy changed 
accordingly with the nomenclature of ‘blue ocean 
strategies’ (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005), new ‘business 
models’, and industry ‘turning points’ and 
‘breakpoints’ (Strebel, 1992). Companies were 
realizing that continual improvement was necessary but 
often not sufficient to stay in the lead; they had also to 
engineer the kinds of radical innovation and strategic 
movement which could be less easily imitated, and 
would result in more durable competitive advantage. 
The search for clues, not only from nature and from the 
life sciences, but from the arts, where completely new 
ways of looking at things have demarcated 
development, has continued apace.  
This section on the history of strategy would 
be incomplete if further reference were not made to the 
two main driving forces of strategic change noted 
earlier, namely technology and globalization. Neither 
are of course new, but the development of both appears 
to be proceeding at an ever-increasing tempo. 
Generational shifts in technology increasingly 
originating with new developments in sciences that lie 
behind specific technologies, are succeeding one 
another with increasing rapidity (the internet, mobile 
telephony, information and communication 
technologies generally, healthcare and life sciences, 
and material sciences are just a few of these). Strategy 
thinking has developed to take account of so-called 
‘disruptive’ technologies (Christensen, 1997), and 
                                                          
2 Kurt Schär, Professor, IMD, Lausanne, 1985 
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these have become the most prominent drivers of 
game-changing strategy. Strategists nevertheless do 
well to remember that non-technological innovation 
also plays a substantial role, even though currently new 
business formation as well as new corporate business 
seems increasingly rooted in technology and 
particularly the internet. 
Globalization has been no less important in 
opening up new strategic possibilities. There has been a 
sea change not only in the need to ‘go beyond borders’ 
in a market sense, but also to understand that we live in 
an increasingly borderless world when it comes to 
sourcing the people and competences that are needed to 
support strategy. There are perhaps as many 
possibilities to source globally and market locally as 
there are to source locally and market globally—our 
original concept of international strategy. 
Table 1 provides a time line of the 
developments, both in strategic practice as well as 
strategic thinking that have been described above.  
  
 
Table 1 - Timeline of the developments in strategic practice and in strategic thinking 
 
YEAR 
 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
700 BC 
500 BC 
Early 1800s 
Mid 1800s 
Mid 1700/Mid 1800s 
1920s 
Late 1920s 
1940s 
1950s/60s 
 
1960s/70s 
 
1960s/70s 
 
 
 
1970s/80s 
 
1980s 
1980s/90s 
1990s 
 
1990s/2000 
1990s- 
 
Homer’s Iliad 
Sun Tzu: The Art of War 
de Caulincourt: With Napoleon in Russia 
Darwin: The Origin of Species 
Industrial revolution 
Henry Ford: Model T etc. 
GM: segmentation for value creation (Chevrolet, Oldsmobile etc) 
Marketing mix, 4 Ps 
Diversification/segmentation: new structures; 
Corporate vs business planning 
Debt ceilings: product portfolio analysis 
Cost importance: experience curves 
PIMS 
Market strategy vs marketing strategy 
Streamlining planning processes: top-down/bottom-up 
Integration of planning and budgeting 
Porter: Value chain; Industry and Competitive Analysis 
5 forces model 
Abell: Business Definition as Strategy Starting Point 
Abell: Dual Strategies 
Strebel: Breakpoints 
Kim & Mauborgne: Blue Ocean Strategies 
Christensen: Disruptive Technologies 
Globalization: Product markets and resource markets 
 
 
 
 
5 THE MEANING OF STRATEGY TODAY 
 
When we talk of strategy today, nearly 100 
years since Ford adopted his famous strategy of ‘any 
color you like as long as it is black’, much flesh has 
been put on the bare bones of the five key elements 
referred to in the previous section, ‘Strategy’s Constant 
Common Core’. What we now include and mean by 
each of these five primordial elements of strategy can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
Objectives:  
 
Mainly the role in the overall corporate or 
business portfolio, namely, is the business to be a cash 
user, cash provider, or cash neutral vis-à-vis other 
businesses. 
 
Business Definition and Scope: 
 
 Horizontally: The definition in terms of 
customer groups served, customer functions 
performed and technologies/means used to 
meet these requirements. 
 Vertically: Where and how the firm uses the 
value chain ‘inside’, and business system 
beyond the firm, to gain competitive 
advantage 
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Positioning: 
 
Where the firm competes in a two-
dimensional map where perceived value is on one axis, 
and delivered cost/price on the other. Further, how the 
firm and its competitors move on this map as they 
prepare to compete in the future. 
 
Segmentation and Focus: 
 
How the market may be segmented for 
competitive advantage, and where the firm chooses 
specifically to compete through a focused strategy, a 
differentiated strategy segment-by-segment, or an 
undifferentiated approach to the whole market.  
 
Differentiation and USP: 
 
What the basis of the firm’s competitive 
advantage is overall, as well as segment-by- segment, 
and how this differentiation is communicated. 
Today’s strategic thinking also recognizes that 
strategy can be described in two distinct time horizons. 
The first is ‘current strategy’ to guide today-for-today 
activities; the second is a strategy for tomorrow which 
is required to guide the development and 
transformation of the firm so that when tomorrow 
arrives, the firm is well prepared for this future. The 
five key elements can thus be thought of in two distinct 
lists (Table 2). 
 
Table 2 – Five key elements 
 
STRATEGY TODAY REQUIRES STRATEGY TOMORROW REQUIRES 
Objectives Resetting of Objectives 
Business Definition Redefining the Business 
Positioning Repositioning 
Segmentation and Focus Resegmentation and Refocus 
Differentiation Redifferentiation 
 
 
 
Strategy can therefore be looked at as a 
filmstrip, which unrolls continuously. As change 
occurs in the competitive or external environment of 
the firm, it requires an anticipation of what has to be 
put in place in terms of competences and resources to 
be ready to meet the future and to implement a future 
strategy. The strategic process can be conceived of as 
one which looks outwards at opportunity and inwards 
at competences to maintain the best ‘fit’ between the 
two, as the film strip continually unrolls. 
 
 
6 THE LIKELY SCOPE AND FOCUS OF 
STRATEGY TOMORROW 
 
Forecasting the shape of things to come is, of 
course, fraught with difficulty. And Yogi Berra’s wise 
words ‘the future ain’t what it used to be’ should ring 
in our ears as a constant reminder of this. Nevertheless 
when it comes to strategy, cristal ball-gazing is not so 
doomed to failure as it may seem at first glance, the 
reason is simple: the new challenges are already upon 
us! What are yet to be developed are the concepts and 
ways to think and act strategically in the face of these 
challenges. 
This author, at least, has for close to a decade 
been placing his bets on two main new  development 
directions, and the unfolding picture of executive 
practice has only reinforced the conviction that these 
development efforts are on the right track. There is 
little place in this article to elaborate the insights which 
have already emerged from this work, but the broad 
outlines can be indicated here. A fuller coverage must 
await the publication of a companion piece to this 
entitled ‘The Evolution of Strategy: A Look Ahead’ 
(Abell, forthcoming). 
The first likely direction in the development of 
new strategic thinking will be to provide practicing 
executives with better ways to envision and plan for the 
future. To this end, this author has been working on six 
related threads of this difficult and complex challenge. 
The six in question are:  
 
 The complementary roles of vision, which 
‘pulls’ the company to the future, and the 
more concrete plans which ‘push’, 
 How companies manage the three key, and 
complementary, instruments of change, 
namely, innovation, investment (in the 
broader sense of ‘platform’ building inside 
and outside the company), and transformation, 
as they navigate to the future. 
 The dual roles of leadership, namely the leader 
as manager (focused on current performance), 
and the leader as entrepreneur/intrapreneur, to 
move the company to the future.  
 ‘Pattern recognition’ and the understanding 
the patterns of evolution in such areas as 
customer behavior, market behavior, 
competitive dynamics, supplier behavior, and 
the broader interplay between innovation and 
investment. 
 ‘Pathways’ followed by competitors in 
dynamic markets on the perceived value—
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delivered cost/price map, as they jostle for 
competitive advantage and search for 
competitively empty spaces. When these 
competitor moves are aggregated together, 
recognizable patterns may be deciphered 
which give clues about future breakpoints and 
turning points. 
 Strategies and competitive counter strategies 
involving the other four primordial strategic 
elements, namely, objectives business 
definition, segmentation, and differentiation. 
The second likely direction, which this author 
has been pursuing, is to find ways to 
conceptualize and deal with the increasingly 
difficult dilemmas that now confront most 
general managers. Setting strategic direction is 
one thing; dealing with what often appear to 
be irreconcilable dilemmas is quite another. 
New ‘strategic’ thinking is necessary if firms 
are to succeed in moving towards the elusive 
goal of sustainability—not only for the planet 
and society, but for the firm itself. 
Among the most pressing dilemmas in the 
new world that executives and their firms find 
themselves in are: 
 To balance the requirement to maintain high 
short-term current performance with the 
innovation, investment, and transformation 
needed to succeed in the future. The question 
of estimating such long-term futures was 
already raised previously; the issue here is 
rather how to achieve the right balance 
between short and long-term. Achieving this 
balance is complicated by the fact that the 
needed balance changes almost constantly as 
business cycles evolve, as financial markets 
swing in pendulum fashion between an 
emphasis on short or long term, and as 
incentive schemes follow.  
 To balance risk and return, as on one hand, 
globalization produces new competitive 
pressures which lower margins and profits, 
and on the other, financial markets demand 
adherence to financial performance which can 
seemingly only be realized by taking on more 
risk.  
 To balance the business agenda with the 
growing calls and needs to take into account at 
the same time the needs of society-at-large. 
Societal needs are multi-dimensional, but 
jobs, the minimization of the negative social 
fall-out resulting from business growth, and 
environmental concerns, stand out. This 
author is not convinced that it is always 
possible, as one book proclaims, ‘to do well 
by doing good’ (Lazlo, 2008), and that often 
hard choices have to be made. To make purely 
business choices, we have seen earlier that the 
strategic process is centered on finding the 
best fit between opportunities, which are 
available, and competences which the firm 
possesses. When the question becomes one of 
balancing the business agenda with broader 
societal agendas, the process also needs to be 
broadened. Not only opportunities (what 
‘could’ be done) and competences (what ‘can’ 
be done) need evaluation, but also what 
‘should’ be done and what the executive 
‘wants’ to do. This balancing of can, could, 
want, and should involves a considerable step 
up in complexity, and needs not only analysis 
but shrewd judgment.  
 To balance the business agenda with the 
personal agendas of both business leadership 
and employees. Two strategies which can be 
observed in practice in this respect which 
clearly do not work are for business leadership 
to ride the corporate horse till the horse flags 
or even dies (as we have seen with some very 
large poorly- led organizations over the last 
couple of decades), or for leadership to ride 
the corporate horse till either they and/or their 
employees flag or die (as we have also seen 
recently).  
 Ensuring that ethical slippage does not 
undermine the integrity of a company. This 
author has for a while been convinced that this 
has less to do with deciding in a black or 
white way what is right or wrong, but rather in 
finding ways to install behaviors in 
organizations which lead to desirable results. 
Codes of conduct and Compliance systems are 
only two of the seven Cs which management 
and leadership need to use to do this. A 
number of cases3 have been written in the last 
few years which show the importance of the 
other five Cs, namely, Communication, 
Controls, Culture, Compensation systems, and 
personal Conduct in achieving such desirable 
behavior.  
Work so far on these dilemmas points in two 
clear directions with respect to the growing 
scope of strategic thinking which will be 
required: First, it suggests that line executives 
need to give considerable more attention than 
they do at present to defining the underlying 
purpose of the business, as they set objectives. 
Without a clear idea of enterprise purpose in 
hand, decisions about how the firm should 
handle the dilemmas it confronts cannot be 
made on a consistent basis. Executives in 
lower or subsidiary positions are therefore 
unlikely to make the right decisions. 
                                                          
3 See for example the cases and teaching notes: ‘George, 
Mario, and Kati’; and ‘George Martin’, by Derek F. Abell, 
ESMT Berlin 2009 (also available through ECCH, UK). 
 
17 
 
The Past, Present, and Future of Strategy: Broadening Challenges; Advancing Insight 
 
_______________________________ 
 
Revista Ibero-Americana de Estratégia - RIAE 
Vol. 13, N. 3. Julho/Setembro. 2014 
 
ABELL 
 
Second, work so far suggest that business 
leadership has to recognize more clearly than before 
that it has three main roles to play (not just the two 
described earlier): The leader as manager; the leader as 
mover and shaper of the future; and the leader 
performing a governance role. Governance, as the word 
is used here, means to put in place the guiding 
principles of vision, values, and purpose which frame 
all other decisions that the enterprise has to make. 
Today, concepts of governance are mostly applied to 
the role of boards. In fact, a high proportion of 
governance breakdowns can be traced to governance 
failures in top management.  
Of course, the author’s concentration on the 
two broad directions outlined above cannot possibly 
include all the possible strategic developments that will 
challenge executives in the future. Globalization will 
continue to bring ever-new challenges and 
opportunities. And technological change will continue 
to disrupt markets, and to turn conventional industry 
logic on its head. One important trend is already quite 
visible here, and that is the shift from technological 
development to developments in the basic sciences that 
often lie behind technology. The food industry is just 
one example. Two decades ago technology 
development was centered on manufacturing processes, 
and food features such as presentation, taste, and 
aroma. Today, the food industry is increasingly driven 
by developments in the life sciences as nutrition and 
well being become ever more important to the 
consumer.  
On the process side, we can only expect more 
decentralization and more ‘pushing down’ of strategic 
responsibility to lower levels within the organization. 
The drivers of this are an ever increasing need to 
segment markets for competitive advantage, and the 
increasing need for entrepreneurial initiative further 
down the line. Strategy making continues not only to 
shift from staff to line, but from upper levels of line 
management to lower ones. 
 
 
7 TAKE HOME 
 
At the outset of this article, the author 
suggested two reasons why all executives need to grasp 
the broad evolutionary sweep of strategy-- past, present 
and future-- which has been described above. The first 
was to reduce errors of omission—executives talking 
about the same strategy in only partial terms, or using 
different language systems. Hopefully this article, and 
particularly what was summarized under the heading 
‘The Meaning of Strategy Today’ will serve this first 
need. 
The second reason given was to reduce errors 
of commission—executives using the wrong 
approach(es) to the challenge(s) that they confront. 
This article can help here too, but care must be taken 
not to apply blindly an approach developed at a 
different point in time and in a quite different economic 
context. Frameworks and concepts should rather be 
used to ask relevant questions than to provide concrete 
answers. Above all, what is required to make 
intelligent use of the approaches referred to in this 
article is a trained and experienced eye and mind to 
identify the shape of the real problems at hand. 
Experience tells us that a large part of successful 
strategy-making, past, present and future, has to do 
with defining the strategic problem at hand at least as 
much as solving it.  
Ibero-American executives, like executives in 
other emerging markets may well be asking themselves 
about the relevance of concepts and frameworks 
developed largely in response to challenges faced in the 
so-called developed markets of North America and 
Europe, and at quite other time points. The answer 
depends of course on the level of detail at which the 
relevance test is applied. It also depends on whether we 
talk about past, present, or future insights. 
As far as level of detail is concerned, the 
generic concepts pointed to in this article have wide-
ranging applicability. The specific strategic choices 
which may emerge from the application of these 
concepts are likely to be substantially rooted in the 
specifics of each country’s and firm’s situation. To be 
more explicit, the five primordial dimensions of 
strategy are quite universal, so even are the current 
definitions of what we now understand by each. What 
will not be the same are the specific strategies which 
will emerge. To give an example: many German multi-
national technology companies are currently 
strategically positioned in the high perceived value—
high cost and price ‘North West’ segment of the 
positioning map. Their problem is how to counter 
lower-cost Asian competition which often offers more 
‘appropriate’ value to customers. For many Ibero-
American competitors the strategic challenge is quite 
different—how to add more value to products and 
services through innovation (especially in the absence 
in some areas of leading-edge technology), and to 
move from somewhere in the middle of the positioning 
map to outflank foreign competitors attacking their 
home and regional markets. 
As far as the applicability of past, present, and 
future concepts is concerned, the answer is most likely 
that there is much to learn from developed market’s 
history. But future challenges and concerns may well 
diverge considerably from the concerns of companies 
in more mature markets. Even when looking back, the 
executives in Ibero-American and other emerging 
markets should be careful to recognize the particular 
nature of their own challenges before applying this or 
that approach too quickly.  
With respect to insight which is likely to be 
needed in the future, certainly the two broad directions 
described earlier, namely, preparing for uncertain 
futures, and finding the right balance between 
conflicting objectives, will likely be highly relevant 
wherever the executive does business. But here it may 
well be that concepts developed in Ibero-America and 
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in other emerging markets inform thinking in the 
world’s more mature markets, not the other way round 
as has historically been the case. The strategic 
challenges that are now likely to be confronted in the 
world’s new and developing economies have 
ingredients never seen before anywhere. There is no 
reason to believe that those regions which are now 
locked into lower growth have a better chance to find 
solutions than those wrestling with rapid or sometimes 
volatile development. Some of the dilemmas which 
have been referred to above, and in particular trade-offs 
between short and long-term, risk and return and 
business and societal agendas, are now being 
confronted even more starkly in the developing world 
than in more developed mature markets. If, as the 
proverb suggests, ‘necessity is the mother of 
invention’, Ibero-American and other emerging 
markets are likely to lead as much as follow in the 
development of strategy and of strategic thinking in the 
future. 
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